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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Moffat asserts that the district court erred in allowing the prosecution for 
attempted strangulation to proceed after he had pled guilty to domestic battery based on 
the same course of conduct in a different proceeding. The second, independent 
prosecution for attempted strangulation placed him in double jeopardy in violation of 
both his state and federal constitutional rights. 
Because there was no bilateral uniqueness to the elements of the statutes under 
which he was separately prosecuted, the second prosecution violated Mr. Moffat's 
constitutional rights. In addition, the charging documents failed to charge separate 
crimes based on separate courses of conduct, which also violated the Idaho 
constitution's protections in addition to the violation evidenced by the lack of bilateral 
uniqueness. Rather, the attempted strangulation charge was merely a means or 
manner by which the domestic battery charge occurred in the same course of conduct. 
Due to these violations of his state and federal constitutional protections against 
double jeopardy, this Court should overturn the district court's order denying his motion 
to dismiss and vacate Mr. Moffat's conviction for attempted strangulation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On May 9, 2010, Mr. Moffat was engaged in a domestic dispute with Jennifer 
Nelson. (R., p.6.) The couple had been dating for approximately a year and had been 
living together for approximately six months. (R., p.6.) At one point during the dispute, 
Mr. Moffat grabbed Ms. Nelson's hair and neck and threw her around the room. 
(R., p.6.) His conduct left marks and scrapes on her neck, back, and knees, all of 
1 
which were still visible to responding officers nearly eight hours later.1 Officer Paul 
Tolman was one of the officers who responded to the incident, and eventually, he 
placed Mr. Moffat under arrest for domestic battery pursuant to I.C. § "18-918(b)(3) 
[sic].,,2 (R., pp.8-9; R., p.71 (copy of the citation issued).) Officer Tolman testified that 
the initial citation was for Mr. Moffat's course of conduct on May 9, 2010, which included 
the actions which caused the injuries about Ms. Nelson's neck. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, 
L.22 - p.25, L.2l 
In a follow-up interview held on May 10, 2010, Ms. Nelson informed Officer 
Tolman that some nights before, Mr. Moffat had threatened both himself and 
Ms. Nelson with his gun. (R., p.9; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.27, Ls.1-18.) Officer Tolman testified that 
the reports generated from that interview were forwarded to the Bannock County 
Prosecutor for a determination if an aggravated assault charge (and not an attempted 
strangulation charge) might be worth pursuing because "that's all we had." (See 
Tr., Vol. 1 , p.27, Ls.19-23.) 
Ms. Nelson amended her statement again on May 14, 2010, modifying it to 
indicate that while Mr. Moffat had his hand about her neck, she had trouble breathing. 
(R., pp.14, 75.) Her amended statement did not indicate that Mr. Moffat made any 
1 Ms. Nelson reported that the dispute had occurred around 5:00 a.m. on May 9, 
2010. (R., p.6.) Officer Paul Tolman was not dispatched to the scene until 12:45 p.m. 
(R., p.6.) 
2 The officer apparently reversed the number and letter of the code cite subsections, 
which is properly "I.c. § 18-918(3)(b)." 
3 There are two separately bound and paginated volumes of transcripts in this case. 
To promote clarity, the volume containing the hearing on Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss, 
held on March 10, 2011, will be referred to as "Tr., VoI.1." The other volume, containing 
the change of plea and sentencing hearings, held on May 2, 2011, and June 27, 2011, 
respectively, will be referred to as "Tr., VoI.2." 
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additional actions, but only that the choking had occurred during his course of conduct 
on May 9, 2010. (See R, pp.14, 75.) 
Mr. Moffat was promptly and initially prosecuted for his conduct on May 9, 
2010, by the City of Pocatello for domestic battery pursuant to I.C. § 18-918(3)(b). 
(R., pp.78-79 (State's Exhibit C - Record of Actions for the misdemeanor case); R p.71 
(the misdemeanor citation); R, p.90 (the district court's recitation of the facts in its 
Minute Entry and Order on the Motion to Dismiss).) Then, more than two months after 
receiving the information and reports from police, the Bannock County prosecutor filed a 
new, separate charge on July 23, 2010, for attempted strangulation in violation of 
I.C. § 18-923(1) based on the May 9,2010, course of conduct. (R, pp.1.) Mr. Moffat 
pled guilty to the domestic battery charge on October 12, 2010, and was sentenced 
accordingly on November 16, 2010. (R, p.79 (State's Exhibit C - Record of Actions 
for the misdemeanor case); R, p.90.) He was bound over to district court for 
attempted strangulation on October 25, 2010. (R, pp.34, 90.) The county prosecutor 
subsequently filed a Prosecuting Attorney's Information on October 28, 2010, alleging a 
violation of I.C. § 18-923(1) based on the May 9, 2010, course of conduct. (R., p.36.) 
Mr. Moffat was arraigned on the attempted strangulation charge in district court on 
November 1, 2010. 4 (R, pp.38-39.) 
Mr. Moffat moved to dismiss the attempted strangulation charge after he had 
pled guilty to the domestic battery charge because the attempted strangulation 
prosecution violated both his state and federal constitutional protections against double 
4 The timeline of these events is critical, and so, to promote clarity, Mr. Moffat 
summarizes the timeline as follows: (1) filing of charges for domestic battery, (2) filing 
of complaint for attempted strangulation, (3) entry of guilty plea to domestic battery, 
(4) binding over for attempted strangulation, (5) filing of information for attempted 
strangulation, and (6) sentencing for domestic battery. 
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jeopardy. (R., pp.51-55.) The district court denied his motion. (R., p.99.) It broke 
its rational into three parts based on the Idaho Court of Appeals' discussion in 
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368 (Ct. App. 2011), which examined Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and the application of Blockburger under the Idaho 
constitution. 
In regard to the statutory theory, 5 the district court claimed that there was the 
requisite bilateral uniqueness in the statutes. (R., p.94.) It asserted that the attempted 
strangulation statute required a unique element of proof because it specifically defined 
the touching (i.e., choke or attempt to strangle), while the battery statute only required a 
general showing of forceful or unwelcome touching. (R., p.94.) However, in regard to 
this perceived distinction, the district court subsequently admitted that, in order to 
commit attempted strangulation, Mr. Moffat "would have to commit a battery.,,6 
(R., p.99 (emphasis added).) The district court also claimed that the domestic battery 
statute required proof of a unique element based on the distinction that the battery 
statute required the victim to be a household member while the attempted strangulation 
statute allowed for a showing that the victim was either a household member or in a 
dating relationship with the offender. (R., p.94.) The district court also applied this 
reasoning to the hybrid theory, which it labeled the "Elements Theory,,,7 holding that 
5 Analysis of whether there is only one offense charged by reviewing the statutes under 
which the defendant has been charged looking for bilateral uniqueness in the elements 
thereof. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
6 The county prosecutor also admitted that absent only the intent to choke, Mr. Moffat's 
actions would constitute a domestic battery (battery against a household member). 
(See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.36, Ls.2-17.) 
7 The hybrid theory has not been formally recognized, but consists of the application of 
aspects from both the pleading theory and the statutory theory to determine whether 
two charges are for a single offense. See, e.g., State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 374 
(Ct. App. 2011); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 (1986). 
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because attempted strangulation focuses on the act of choking or strangling (and not 
specifically "a battery"), the attempted strangulation statute does not incorporate the 
elements of the domestic battery statute (which does require commission of a battery). 
(R., pp.97-99.) 
The district court also found that, under the pleading theory,8 Mr. Moffat's 
assertion that he pled guilty based only on his grabbing at the victim's neck was 
disproved by Officer Tolman's report and testimony that there were other injuries 
involved and that the basis for the attempted strangulation charge was not reported until 
Ms. Nelson amended her initial statement on May 14, 2010. (R., p.96.) Officer Tolman 
had testified that, as to the initial investigation and charge: 
A [Officer Tolman]. She had scrape marks on her nose. I believe she had 
scrape marks on her back, and she did have some finger-type marks on 
her neck that I could distinguish. 9 
Q [by prosecutor]. And when you went about completing the investigation, 
you issued a citation? 
A. I did, for Domestic Battery .... 
Q. You said that you had not determined that there had been any felony 
committed? 
A. At that time, no. I didn't see any felony. 
(Tr., Vo/'1, p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.2.) He continued, in regard to the subsequent 
statements made by Ms. Nelson: 
8 The pleading theory requires analysis of whether there is only one offense charged by 
reviewing the statutes under which the defendant has been charged looking at the 
pleading documents to see if one crime was alleged as a means to commit or element 
of another crime. State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,434 (1980). 
9 In his report, Officer Tolman had described these marks as "injuries to the left side of 
her neck. She had several red scrape marks consistent with finger marks." (R., p.5.) 
He also stated that they were "distinct red marks on her neck which still appeared to be 
fresh and had fresh scraped skin." (R., p.6.) 
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Q [by prosecutor]. But at a later time date in time, did you make a 
determination there had been a possible felony? 
A [Officer Tolman]. I did. The following day1° after [Ms. Nelson] had gone 
to court, she came back in and was upset that we hadn't mentioned 
anything about the report of Mr. Moffat holding a gun to her head, and I 
went back and reviewed the notes that Sergeant Higby and I had taken 
and a tape-recorded interview that we had conducted and found that I had 
missed that when she said it. She said it very briefly,11 and it kind of came 
back to -- she came back to ask why we didn't bring it up, so we brought 
her back in and did an interview again, tape-recorded, and she gave us a 
little more information ... and then we forwarded that to the Prosecuting 
Attorney to make the determination on felony charges. 
Q. And you said "felony charges" was just ag [sic] assault that she --
A. We were just looking for Aggravated Assault at that point; that's all we 
had. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.26, L.26 - p.27, L.23.) Officer Tolman also indicated that there was a 
subsequent interview with Ms. Nelson, but that he had not participated in that interview. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.3.) The report from that subsequent interview on 
May 12, 2010, indicated that Ms. Nelson clarified her initial statement, stating that while 
Mr. Moffat had his hand about her neck, he caused her to be unable to breathe, and 
tossed her to the floor. (R., p.14.) She did not mention any new action by Mr. Moffat 
during the course of conduct on May 9,2010. (See generally R, pp.14-16.) 
After his motion to dismiss was denied, Mr. Moffat agreed to a conditional, 
binding plea agreement. (R, pp.117 -119.) Per the agreement, Mr. Moffat would plead 
guilty to attempted strangulation, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his 
10 Based on the fact that Officer Tolman indicated that a subsequent interview took 
place with other officers, and the only other such interview indicated in the records was 
held on May 12, 2010, "the following day" must be May 10, 2010. (See R, p.78.) This 
is consistent with his statement that this interview took place after Ms. Nelson had gone 
to court, and Mr. Moffat's arraignment on the misdemeanor domestic battery charge 
was held on May 10, 2010. (R., p.78.) 
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motion to dismiss, and he could withdraw his guilty plea if he won that challenge. 
(R., p.117.) The State agreed that the binding agreement would require a sentence of 
probation, but that the duration of the underlying sentence and length of probation 
would be left to the district court. (R., p.118.) It also agreed to recommend a withheld 
judgment, although that recommendation would not be binding on the district court. 
(R., p.118.) The district court agreed to be bound by those terms. (See, e.g., 
R., p.119.) It did not, however, grant the withheld judgment. (Tr., pAO, Ls.18-2S.) 
Accordingly, it imposed a unified sentence of eleven years, with five years fixed, and 
suspended that sentence for a period of five years. (R., p.122.) 
Mr. Moffat exercised his right under the conditional agreement and filed a timely 
notice of appeal challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.130-133.) 
11 The summary of those notes included in the report forwarded to the prosecutor 
indicate that the event with the gun was a significant point of conversation during that 
interview. (R., pp.1S, 76-77.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss because the 




The District Court Improperly Denied Mr. Moffat's Motion To Dismiss Because The 
Second Prosecution Violated His State And Federal Constitutional Rights To Be Free 
From Double Jeopardy 
A. Introduction 
Both the state and federal constitutions provide protection from double jeopardy. 
Both those protections are violated when the State subjects the defendant to separate 
prosecutions or separate punishments under two statutes which are not bilaterally 
unique from one another, meaning that each statute must have an element unique from 
the other statute. Where one statute does not have a unique element from another 
statute, it is considered to be an included offense, and thus, separate prosecution or 
separate punishment under those statutes is a violation of the protections against 
double jeopardy. A violation of the state constitution's protections may also be 
demonstrated by showing that both charges arise out of the same course of conduct 
and one charge is merely the means or manner by which the other is committed. 
In this case, domestic battery and attempted strangulation are included offenses 
to one another. As Mr. Moffat had already been charged and pled guilty to domestic 
battery, the second, independent prosecution and second punishment for attempted 
strangulation violated his constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. As such, 
the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for that reason was improper. This 
Court should overturn that decision and dismiss the attempted strangulation case. 
B. Engaging In The Second Prosecution Or Alternatively, Imposing The Second 
Punishment In The Attempted Assault Case Violated Mr. Moffat's Constitutional 
Rights To Be Free From Double Jeopardy 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Double 
Jeopardy Clause to mean that "two valid sentences for the same conviction cannot 
9 
coexist." Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 267 (1943). Article I, Section 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with the federal provision. State v. McKeeth, 136 
Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001). These protections can be violated in three ways: 
(1) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been 
entered; (2) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction 
has been entered; or (3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United 
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. In this 
case, Mr. Moffat's rights were violated pursuant to both the second and third 
alternatives. The State engaged in a second prosecution for the same offense after a 
conviction. 12 The State also imposed multiple convictions for the same offense. Under 
either provision, Mr. Moffat's constitutional rights were violated. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 
U.S. 161, 166 (1977); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525,527,530-31 (2011). 
There are two tests in Idaho to determine whether the prosecution of multiple 
charges is actually multiple prosecutions for the same offense. See, e.g., Flegel, 151 
Idaho at 527, 530-31. The first is the same as the federal courts apply to the federal 
constitution: the statutory theory established in Blockburger. Id. at 527. The second is 
the broader pleading theory, established in Idaho in Thompson, supra. Corbus, 151 
Idaho at 374; see Flegel, 151 Idaho at 229. Subsequent interpretations of the 
Thompson rule have, however, hybridized the two tests, applying elements of both 
when determining whether only one offense exists. See Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374 
(examining Sivak, supra, State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 (1991), overruled on other 
12 Entry of a guilty plea constitutes a "conviction." United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 
403, 404 (2008). 
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grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,433 (1991), and State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 
383 (2010)). 
The result of the hybridization is that if a prosecution fails under either test, the 
second prosecution is constitutionally invalid and the second conviction should be 
vacated. See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 530-31 (examining "whether a violation of [a 
statute] was an included offense of the indictment charging a violation of [another 
statute] under either the statutory or pleading theory") (emphasis added); see also 
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374-75 (detailing the precedent applying both tests to alleged 
violations of the Idaho constitution). 
1. Under The Blockburger Statutory Theory,13 The Second Prosecution For 
Attempted Strangulation Is Constitutionally Invalid Under Both The State 
And Federal Constitutions, As The Requisite Bilateral Uniqueness Does 
Not Exist Between The Domestic Battery And Attempted Strangulation 
Statutes 
The United States Supreme Court held that, to determine whether multiple 
prosecutions violated the federal Constitution's protection against double jeopardy, 
courts are to look to the elements of the statutes under which the defendant had been 
charged. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Where the statutes were bilaterally 
unique, in that "each provision requires proof of a fact [element] which the other does 
not," there were two offenses and there was no double jeopardy violation in pursuing 
multiple prosecutions. Id. 
The two statutes at issue in this case are I.C. § 18-923(1) (attempted 
strangulation) and I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) (misdemeanor domestic battery). (See, e.g., 
13 Since the hybridization theory discussed in Corbus, 151 Idaho 374-75, returns to an 
analysis of the elements of the statute, that theory is necessarily discussed 
simultaneously with the statutory theory. 
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R., pp.1, 71; see also R., pp.36, 78.) The elements for attempted strangulation are that 
the defendant (1) willfully and unlawfully (2) choked or attempted to strangle 
(3) a household member. I.C. § 18-923(1); see also I.C.J.I. 1214. The elements for 
misdemeanor domestic battery are that the defendant (1) committed a battery 
(2) against a household member. I.C. § 18-918(3)(b); see also I.C.J.I. 1204. The 
elements for a battery are that the defendant (1) willfully and unlawfully (2a) used 
force of violence upon the victim, or (2b) touched or struck the victim against his or her 
will, or (2c) caused bodily harm to the victim.14 I.C. § 18-903; see also I.C.J.I. 1204. 
Both statutes require willful and unlawful action against a household member.15 
Compare I.C. § 18-923(1) with I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) and I.C. § 18-903. The only other 
element required in either statute is that the defendant touches the victim. Id. 
The district court erroneously forced a distinction between the statutes, 
specifically trying to justify a distinction between general touching or use of force and 
touching or use of force with intent to strangle. (See R., p.94.) The Blockburger test is 
14 There are three alternative means by which a person may commit a battery and each 
uses its own phrasing of the mens rea requirement (i.e., "willfully and unlawfully" as 
opposed to "actually, intentionally, and unlawfully"). See I.C. § 18-903; see also I.C.J.I. 
1204. These variations, as well as the alternatives in regard to the actus reus, are not 
substantively different, leaving "a battery" summarized as "the willful and unlawful 
touching of another person." See id. 
15 As will be discussed in depth on page 15, infra, the term "household member" in the 
domestic battery statute (I.C. § 18-918) has been interpreted to include all "intimate 
relationships." Therefore, the fact that the attempted strangulation statute (I.C. § 18-
923) has the additional option of "dating relationship" is irrelevant because that would 
constitute an intimate relationship, especially since, in this case, the couple was 
cohabitating. As such, both statutes require proof of the element that the victim and 
defendant were in an intimate relationship. Regardless, included offenses need not be 
coextensive; one may require proof of additional elements without voiding the 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 164; 
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114 (1979). However, where only one statute 
requires proof of additional elements, there is not the requisite bilateral uniqueness 
necessary to allow the dual prosecutions. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
12 
not so specific; rather, the question is whether each statutory provision requires proof of 
a fact [element] not required by the other statute. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 180. The 
United States Supreme Court has clarified that, "[i]t has long been understood that 
separate statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent elements or in 
actual proof in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition." 
Brown, 432 U.S. at 164. Both of the statutes in question require proof of a forceful or 
otherwise unwelcome touching. See I.C. § 18-923(1); I.C. § 18-918(3)(b). The only 
difference is the specificity required to prove that fact: touching, as opposed to touching 
with the intent to choke or strangle. Id. However, as the Brown Court pointed out, such 
variation in required proof does not void the constitutional protection. Brown, 432 U.S. 
at 164. Both statutes require proof of the fact that the defendant touched the victim in a 
forceful, unwelcome, or unlawful manner. See I.C. § 18-923(1); I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) (and 
I.C. § 18-903 included by reference therein). Since both statutes require proof of the 
same elements, there is no bilateral uniqueness. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 
304; Brown, 432 U.S. at 164. Therefore, charges under the two statutes may not be 
separately prosecuted because they are included charges. Id.; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208; 
Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392. 
The prosecutor admitted as much (that domestic battery is an included offense to 
attempted strangulation) during the hearing on Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss: 
THE COURT: [L]et's assume for purposes of this argument 
that. . . he grabbed her neck, but the evidence doesn't show that he 
actually attempted to strangle or choke her, just grabbed her by the neck, 
then would that necessarily be a Domestic Battery? 
[PROSECUTOR]: That could be a misdemeanor Domestic Battery . 
. . . [B]ut to have an attempt[ed] strangulation, you have to have intent to 
choke or strangle. 
13 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.36, Ls.2-10, 16-17 (implying that the only difference between domestic 
battery and attempted strangulation is whether the defendant committed the battery with 
the intent to choke or strangle).) Where the only difference is the need to prove a 
particular intent, the crimes are considered included offenses. See Brown, 432 U.S. 
at 167.16 The district court also admitted that bilateral uniqueness does not exist 
between these two statutes, although its admission was far more explicit: "While it is 
true that a defendant would have to commit a battery in order to complete the 
crime of attempted strangulation, the attempted strangulation statute does not 
contemplate or require as an element of the offense that the defendant commit a 
battery.,,17 (R., p.99 (emphasis added).) This logic is a perfect demonstration of 
unilateral uniqueness: all attempted strangulations are batteries, but not all batteries 
16 Brown dealt with the question of whether joyriding and auto theft were included 
offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. Brown, 432 U.S. at 167. To that end, the 
United States Supreme Court found: 
Joyriding consists of taking or operating a vehicle without the owner's 
consent, and auto theft consists of joyriding with the intent permanently to 
deprive the owner of possession. Joyriding is the lesser included offense. 
The prosecutor who has established joyriding need only prove the 
requisite intent in order to establish auto theft. 
Id. (emphasis added). Based on the State's admission (through its representative, the 
county prosecutor), Mr. Moffat's actions constituted at least a domestic battery, and all 
that the prosecutor needed to show to prove an attempted strangulation was the 
requisite intent. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p. p.36, Ls.2-10, 16-17.) Therefore, just as in Brown, 
domestic battery is an included offense to attempted strangulation and the subsequent 
prosecution violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from 
double jeopardy. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 167-68; see also Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208; 
Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392. 
17 The only other element to reach domestic battery from traditional battery is that the 
battery be committed against a household member. I.C. § 19-918(3)(b). Attempted 
strangulation also requires proof of commission against a household member. 
I.C. § 18-923(1). As such, domestic battery does not require proof of an element that 
attempted strangulation does not, and without the necessary bilateral uniqueness, the 
second prosecution violates the constitutional protections. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 
U.S. at 304; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392. 
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are attempted strangulations. 18 Since the district court and the prosecutor both 
acknowledged that an attempted strangulation must constitute a battery, the only 
possible point of uniqueness between the statutes revolves around who must be the 
victim of the touching. 
The district court pointed out that the domestic battery statute required the State 
to prove the act had been committed against a household member, but that attempted 
strangulation could be committed against a household member or a person with whom 
the defendant was in a dating relationship. (R., p.94.) However, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has determined in regard to the term "household member" in the domestic battery 
statute: 
all examples of 'household member' preceding the ambiguous phrase-
"spouse, former spouse, or a person who has a child in common 
regardless of whether they have been married"-denote marital or 
intimate relationship. I.C. § 18-918(1 )(a). In addition, the phrase at issue 
["a person with whom a person is cohabiting"] is followed by the qualifying 
phrase "whether or not they have married or have held themselves out to 
be husband or wife." Id. ... [T]he definition of "household member" plainly 
does not apply in the absence of an intimate relationship . ... 
State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (2011) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the term 
"household members" in the domestic battery statute encompasses all those persons in 
intimate relationships, that term must include persons in a dating relationship. 
Regardless, the two potential points of uniqueness are both in the attempted 
strangulation statute (it has the more specific touching requirement and it has the 
additional potential victim). That does not, however, make the statutes bilaterally 
unique. As has long been the case with included offenses: 
An offense will be deemed to be a lesser included offense of another, 
greater offense, if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the 
18 Bilateral uniqueness requires the conclusion that not all attempted strangulations are 
batteries and not all batteries are attempted strangulations. 
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lesser included offense are included within the elements needed to sustain 
a conviction of the greater offense. Of course, the greater offense may 
require proof of additional elements in order to sustain a conviction. Or, if 
in committing an offense one necessarily commits a second offense, that 
second offense will be deemed a lesser included offense. 
McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114 (emphasis added). Since there is no element unique to 
the domestic battery statute (i.e., all the elements required to sustain a conviction for 
domestic battery are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction for 
attempted strangulation, see McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114),19 dual prosecution under 
these two statutes fails the Blockburger test. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; 
McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392. 
Because I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) does not require proof of any unique element from 
I.C. § 18-923(1), there is no bilateral uniqueness between the statutes and domestic 
battery is an included offense for attempted strangulation. Thus, the dual prosecutions 
and sentences violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free 
from double jeopardy. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; Flegel, 151 Idaho at 
530-31; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392. 
2. Under The Thompson Pleading Theory, The Second Prosecution For 
Attempted Strangulation Is Invalid Under The Idaho Constitution, As The 
Attempted Strangulation Was Merely The Means Or Manner By Which 
The Domestic Battery Was Committed 
As to the pleading theory, the district court misapplied the test. When 
establishing the test in Thompson, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear that where 
there is only one course of conduct, a second prosecution was constitutionally 
19 The State must prove that the defendant intentionally and unlawfully touched a 
household member. Aggravated Strangulation incorporates all those elements, only 
adding the additional requirements that the touching be done with the intent to choke or 
strangle, and that the intimate relationship necessary for the "household member" 
requirement include a dating relationship. 
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impermissible. See, e.g., Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 ("There is no separate event 
upon which to base the additional charge.") Instead, in situations where there is but one 
event, the second charge may simply be the means or manner by which the first charge 
might be committed. Id. For example, the Thompson Court examined Whalen v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980), in which assault with a deadly weapon was but the means 
by which the defendant attempted to commit robbery.20 Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435. 
Without a second course of conduct, there could be no second offense. Id. 
Idaho courts consistently applied this rule to subsequent cases. See, e.g., Sivak, 
112 Idaho at 211-12 (holding that where robbery was the prerequisite felony for a felony 
murder charge, it was the manner or means by which the felony murder was committed. 
Therefore, as charged, robbery was an included offense of felony murder, and as such, 
a separate conviction for robbery was constitutionally impermissible); compare Pizzuto, 
119 Idaho at 757 (holding that, because first-degree murder as charged required proof 
of specific intent to kill the victim (see I.C. § 18-4001), robbery was not the means or 
manner of that offense (like it was with a felony murder charge, where the killing was 
not a premeditated result of the robbery (see I.C. § 18-4003(d)). Rather, the killing 
constituted its own separate and distinct course of actions, which included the 
premeditation. Therefore, robbery, as charged, was not an included offense for first-
degree murder and the dual convictions are constitutionally permissible).21 
20 The Thompson Court provided a clear example of the contrasting situation in its 
examination of McCormick, 100 Idaho 111. In McCormick, dual convictions were 
permissible for rape and burglary because the burglary was complete once the 
defendant entered the victim's house, which was the first course of conduct. The 
defendant then engaged in a new, second course of conduct (the acts of intercourse), 
which was the basis for the rape. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435. 
21 It is interesting to note that in applying the Thompson pleading theory, the courts still 
look to the statutory elements underlying the charges. See Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374. 
As such, while the proper test for double jeopardy under the Idaho constitution may not 
17 
In this case, it is clear that there was only one course of conduct underlying both 
charges - the incident on May 9, 2010. (See R., p.1 (charge for attempted strangulation 
explicitly based on the events of May 9, 2010); R., p.71 (citation issued for domestic 
battery on May 9, 2010), Tr., Vol. 1 , p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9 (Officer Tolman's testimony 
that he issued the domestic battery charge based on all the injuries resulting from 
Mr. Moffat's course of conduct on May 9, 2010).) There is no separate event upon 
which the attempted strangulation could be based, and so the second prosecution and 
second punishment for that charge violated Mr. Moffat's state constitutional right to be 
free from double jeopardy. See, e.g., Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 
211-12. 
The district court focused too narrowly on the facts and forced an improper 
separation into Mr. Moffat's course of conduct. (See R., p.97.) The United States 
Supreme Court has clearly held that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile 
guarantee that prosecutors [or judges] can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient 
of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units." Brown, 432 U.S. at 
169. Yet the district court explicitly said that was what it was doing: 
The Defendant, in fact, committed the separate and distinct crime of 
domestic battery when he grabbed the victim by the hair and threw her 
around the room, which resulted in abrasions to her back and knees .... 22 
be fully clear, a violation under either the statutory or pleading theory likely constitutes a 
violation of the other as well. See, e.g., Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374 (citing Stewart, 149 
Idaho at 389 nA). Thus, a violation of either the pleading theory orthe statutory theory 
results in a violation of the Idaho constitution's protections against double jeopardy. 
Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527,530-31. 
22 Ms. Nelson did not report that Mr. Moffat had caused her other injuries stopped, and 
then began to strangle her. (See generally, R., pp.5-16.) Rather, she only reported that 
he had grabbed her about the hair and neck and threw her into various objects. 
(R., p.6.) Her amended report only indicated that during this time, she felt unable to 
breathe. (R., pp.14, 75.) Regardless, her version of the events was that the choking 
occurred as part of the same course of conduct: "She did not know how long she'd 
been choked, but remembers after being choked she was tossed to the ground. She 
18 
Therefore, this Court must conclude that although these two crimes 
occurred at the same time, there are distinct facts and circumstances that 
resulted in the commission of two separate crimes. 
(R., p.97.) The district court's analysis was directly contrary to established United 
States Supreme Court precedent, and thus was clearly erroneous. Rather, there was 
but one course of conduct which underlay both prosecutions and there was no 
separation between the acts. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 167-69. As such, under the 
pleading theory, the second and independent prosecution for attempted strangulation 
was constitutionally invalid. See id.; Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 
211-12. 
Apart from focusing too narrowly for purposes of the pleading theory, the district 
court's determination of the facts under that theory was clearly erroneous. (Compare 
R., p.96 with R., pp.76-77.) The district court claimed that Mr. Moffat's assertion - that 
he pled guilty based on his grabbing at the victim's neck23 - was disproved by Officer 
Tolman's report and testimony. (R., p.96.) In fact, Officer Tolman testified that the 
indicated that while [Mr.] Moffat was choking her, he was pulling her hair with the other 
hand. She stated that she was in a lot of pain during this incident." (R., pp.14, 75 
(emphasis added).) As such, the record clearly indicates only one course of conduct, 
and as such, there is no valid, constitutional basis for the second, independent 
prosecution. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12; but see 
McCormick, 100 Idaho 114-15 (a continuous stream of events constitutes two separate 
offenses when the course of events required for one dissimilar offense (i.e., burglary-
breaking and entering with intent to commit a theft or felony therein (see I.C. § 18-
1401)) is completed before the course of events required for the other dissimilar offense 
begins (i.e., rape - requires an act of intercourse (see I.C. § 18-1601), and the reason 
such a result is acceptable is that there is bilateral uniqueness between the governing 
statutes). 
23 If true, this would unambiguously demonstrate that the two charges were for the same 
offense. (See, e.g., R., pp.96-97.) It is not necessary to prove that, however. The fact 
that there was not a separate course of conduct and that one charge (attempted 
strangulation) was but the means or method by which the other (domestic battery) was 
committed is sufficient to demonstrate that the two charges were for one offense. See 
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435. 
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report he forwarded to the county prosecutor was only in relation to a potential 
aggravated assault charge from a different date, not Mr. Moffat's conduct on May 9, 
2010: 
A [Officer Tolman]. She had scrape marks on her nose. I believe she had 
scrape marks on her back, and she did have some finger-type marks on 
her neck that I could distinguish. 
Q [by prosecutor]. And when you went about completing the investigation, 
you issued a citation? 
A. I did, for Domestic Battery .... 
Q. You said that you had not determined that there had been any felony 
committed? 
A. At that time, no. I didn't see any felony. 
Q. But at a later time date in time, did you make a determination there 
had been a possible felony? 
A. I did. The following day after [Ms. Nelson] had gone to court, she 
came back in and was upset that we hadn't mentioned anything about the 
report of Mr. Moffat holding a gun to her head, and I went back and 
reviewed the notes that Sergeant Higby and I had taken and a tape-
recorded interview that we had conducted and found that I had missed 
that when she said it. She said it very briefly,24 and it kind of came back to 
-- she came back to ask why we didn't bring it up, so we brought her back 
in and did an interview again, tape-recorded, and she gave us a little more 
information ... and then we forwarded that to the Prosecuting Attorney to 
make the determination on felony charges. 
Q. And you said "felony charges" was just ag [sic] assault that she-
24 The summary of those notes included in the report forwarded to the prosecutor 
indicate that the event with the gun was a significant point of conversation during that 
interview. (R., p.15.) As such, the officer's testimony that Ms. Nelson "said it very 
briefly" (implying that her focus was on other facts, which the district court determined, 
without any other indication in the record to that effect, to be Mr. Moffat's conduct on 
May 9, 2010) is either a gross misremembrance or a deliberate misrepresentation of the 
facts. Either way, in light of the clear evidence in the reports included in the record 
(see, e.g., R., pp.6-16. 75-77), the district court could not have reasonably relied on that 
testimony to undermine Mr. Moffat's representations about the procedural history of his 
case. 
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A. We were just looking for Aggravated Assault at that point; that's all we 
had." 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, L.22 - p.27, L.23.) The fact that Officer Tolman testified that he 
forwarded his report in order to get a determination on a potential aggravated assault 
because "that's all we had" on May 10, 2010, also indicates that he believed the charge 
of domestic battery adequately dealt with Mr. Moffat's course of conduct on May 9, 
2010. (See Tr., p.27, Ls.1-23.) As the record demonstrates, the district court relied on 
the officer's statements in regard to an entirely separate investigation to attempt to 
create a distinction between parts of Mr. Moffat's conduct on May 9, 2010. (See 
R., p.96.) Officer Tolman's testimony did not contradict anything asserted by Mr. Moffat 
in regard to his conduct on May 9,2010, (see Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, L.22 - p.27, L.23) and, as 
such, the district court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous. 
Worse, the district court decided that what Officer Tolman had meant to say was 
that there were other injuries involved, which were the basis for the initial citation and 
that it was only after a follow-up interview, in which the victim confronted him regarding 
potential attempted strangulation charges, that he referred the issue pertaining to 
attempted strangulation to the prosecutors. 25 (R., p.96.) Such reading of the facts is 
25 As all these injuries were part of the event which occurred on May 9, 2010, the subtle 
distinction between which particular act underlay each charge is inappropriate. 
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12. Rather, the focus is properly 
on the course of conduct as a whole, and what the charges filed were. Id. Therefore, 
as both charging documents were for Mr. Moffat's actions on May 9, 2010, (particularly, 
the citation for the misdemeanor domestic battery, which covered all the injuries 
Ms. Nelson suffered (see R., pp.71-73), there was only one course of conduct, and 
thus, no independent basis for the second prosecution. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 
435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12 (even though the individual actions required to prove 
robbery and felony murder are different (taking of property by force, as opposed to 
causing the death of another human being) independent conviction for robbery could 
not stand because it was the means or method by which the felony murder was 
committed); but see Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 757 (the only way for actions within the same 
course of conduct to be separate offenses is to have bilateral uniqueness). 
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also clearly erroneous. Officer Tolman's summarized for which injuries (and thus, for 
which actions) the domestic battery charge had been issued: "She had scrape marks 
on her nose. I believe she had a scrape mark on her back, and she did have some 
finger-type marks on her neck that I could distinguish.,,26 (Tr., p.24, L.20 - p.25, L.2 
(emphasis added).) Because he included the marks to Ms. Nelson's neck within the 
injuries covered by the domestic battery charge, Officer Tolman had to necessarily 
include the grasping of the throat as part of the course of conduct underlying the 
domestic battery charge. As a result, the charging document (the officer's citation) 
covered Mr. Moffat's course of conduct, which included the grasping of Ms. Nelson's 
throat. Thus, the charging document for the attempted strangulation triggered a second 
prosecution and ultimately a second punishment for that same course of conduct. (See 
R., pp.1, 36.) That second prosecution and second punishment for that same charged 
offense violated Mr. Moffat's state constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 
See e.g., Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12. 
Had the State wanted to pursue both counts, it could have sought a single 
indictment charging each crime as a separate count. 27 Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31. 
26 In his report, Officer Tolman had described these marks as "injuries to the left side of 
her neck. She had several red scrape marks consistent with finger marks." (R., p.5.) 
He also stated that they were "distinct red marks on her neck which still appeared to be 
fresh and had fresh scraped skin." (R., p.6.) These descriptions indicate that they were 
actual injuries which Officer Tolman had included as part of his charge for domestic 
battery. 
27 Cities and counties are not separate sovereigns, but are rather subordinate entities 
within the sovereignty of the State. '''Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or 
whatever-never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, 
they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities 
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.'" 
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 (1970) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
575 (1964»; Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 468-69 (recognizing the Waller holding as 
controlling law). Therefore, the fact that the two prosecutions were carried out by 
different prosecuting bodies (the City of Pocatello and Bannock County) does not 
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Proceeding in a separate prosecution for the second allegation based on the 
same course of conduct, however, violates the protections against double jeopardy. 
See, e.g., Blo ckb urger, 284 U.S. at 304; Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31; Stewart, 149 
Idaho at 392. In this case, therefore, where there are two separate prosecutions and 
two separate punishments for the same offense, the second prosecution and second 
punishment violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from 
double jeopardy, and thus the second conviction cannot stand. See Flegel, 151 Idaho 
at 530-31; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392. Therefore, the district court's denial of 
Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss was improper and should be overturned. The result is 
that his conviction for attempted strangulation should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Moffat respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his conviction. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2012. 
L-/~ 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
prevent the dual prosecutions from violating Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy. See id. And, as such, the State did have the 
power to combine the two prosecutions if it wanted to pursue both charges. 
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